"We Will Break Their Teeth" (continued) - told by Boris ARUSHANYAN
The article by Boris Arushanyan, Chairman of the Civic Council of the NKR, is a continuation of his memoirs on the Karabakh settlement negotiation process, published in "ANIV" No. 2 (23) (the beginning appeared in No. 1 (22), 2009).
Introduction and Methodology
The material is structured as an oral narrative-interview in which the author reconstructs the course of negotiations within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group in the first half of the 1990s, analyzes the behavior of the conflicting parties' delegations, and the internal political discussions in Armenia and Karabakh regarding negotiation tactics.
Arguments in Favor of NKR's Participation in the Negotiations
Arushanyan elaborates in detail on the position that led to his appointment as head of the Karabakh delegation:
- participation in negotiations relieves part of the burden from the Republic of Armenia and prevents it from being branded an "aggressor";
- refusal to negotiate indirectly confirms accusations of aggression;
- the OSCE format is recognized as most advantageous for a defending, unrecognized, and resource-limited party, since it does not involve forcible coercion into decisions, unlike the UN format.
The Course of Negotiations: Contrast Between the Delegations
The author compares the high level of preparation of the Karabakh delegation with the unprofessionalism of the Azerbaijani side (episodes involving Minister Kasymov, the conflict over the interpreter Petros) and notes the acknowledgment by the American representative Maresca regarding the correctness and professionalism of the Karabakh side. According to the author's testimony, the initiative in the negotiations passed to the Armenian side, supported by the delegation of the Republic of Armenia headed by Kristian Ter-Stepanyan.
Assessment of Levon Ter-Petrosyan's Role
A significant part of the material is devoted to a critical analysis of the policy of Armenia's first president, whom the author characterizes as excessively cautious and indecisive, one who did not believe in the possibility of complete military victory. It is precisely this caution, in Arushanyan's opinion, that led to the Armenian forces halting a successful offensive three times, without bringing the war to its logical conclusion, thereby giving Azerbaijan the opportunity to restore its strength.
Principles of Open Diplomacy
A separate section is devoted to the episode involving the signing of the ceasefire observer mandate in 1993 and the ensuing public reaction. The author substantiates the principle of conducting negotiations publicly rather than behind closed doors, emphasizing that the people's trust is more important than preserving the secrecy of diplomatic maneuvers.
Current Conditions and Prospects
In the concluding part of the article, the author formulates current tasks: returning the NKR to the negotiating table as an independent party, the need to consolidate Armenia's political forces and effectively utilize the potential of the Spyurk (Diaspora), and also proposes a three-tier system of security guarantees — national, regional, and international.
Key Conclusion: The incompleteness of the military victory of the 1990s, caused by the indecisiveness of the Republic of Armenia's leadership at the time, determined the vulnerability of the current negotiating position; at the same time, current conditions — the strengthening of the Artsakh army, the absence of forcible coercion — create favorable prerequisites for an active and open diplomatic strategy, provided there is internal political unity among the Armenian parties.
The head of the Karabakh delegation to the OSCE Minsk Group negotiations reconstructs the course of the diplomatic struggle of the 1990s and explains why that era's military victory was never carried through to completion.
Unfinished Victory, Cost of Indecision