«Մի ճանապարհով նրանք կելնեն քո դեմ, իսկ յոթ ճանապարհով կփախչեն…» - Վալերի ԳԱԶԱՐՅԱՆ

The article by Valery Gazaryan, a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the NKR from 1992 to 1995, is devoted to a comprehensive reassessment of Operation "Ring" and the events preceding it as a link in a deliberate Union policy aimed at the forcible subjugation of Artsakh to the Azerbaijan SSR.

Introduction and Methodology
The author, drawing on personal recollections and participation in the events, emphasizes the necessity of viewing Operation "Ring" not as a local episode, but as a product of planning at the highest Union level, coordinated by the leadership of the MVD, the Ministry of Defense, the KGB of the USSR, and the Azerbaijan SSR.

Background: From the Committee of Special Administration to the Polyanichko Organizing Committee

The dissolution of A. Volsky's Committee of Special Administration (November 28, 1989) and the appointment of V. Polyanichko.
The relocation of the commandant's office to the party regional committee building in the center of Stepanakert, which was used for recruitment and pressure on local leaders.
The role of Volsky as a statesman seeking to avoid bloodshed, and his displacement as destructive tendencies in Union policy intensified.

Methods of Pressure on the Population of Artsakh

Large-scale plunder: cattle rustling, grain removal, poisoning of Stepanakert's water intake facilities.
"Passport regime inspections" as a cover for confiscating weapons from the population.
The advance of "Grad" rocket systems toward the border with Armenia on the eve of the operation.
Attempts to recruit veterans, party, and economic leaders, mostly unsuccessful.

Operation "Ring"

The beginning of the deportation of Armenian villages (Getashen, then from May 13 onward — the territory of the NKAO), the destruction of 14 villages in the Hadrut district within a single day.
The impossibility of armed resistance given the clear imbalance of forces.
Successful informational counteraction: a statement requesting political asylum, transmitted through an Interfax correspondent, which caused international resonance and halted the deportations.
Parallels with the events of 1918–1920: a repetition of the scenario of expelling the Armenian population from the districts bordering Armenia, but this time carried out by Soviet structures (Generals V. Safonov, G. Malyushkin).

Reasons for the Failure of the Union Plan

The Center's underestimation of the resilience of the Armenians of Artsakh and the depth of the popular movement.
A mistaken perception of the region as a fully controlled "agricultural oblast."
The people's readiness to make sacrifices for freedom — a factor not taken into account by the specialists who prepared the operation.

Criticism of Armenian Political Strategy
The author points to the shortsightedness of Armenia's leadership (L. Ter-Petrosyan, the ANM), which initiated a referendum on secession from the USSR at a moment when Azerbaijan was demonstrating loyalty to the Center. In the author's view, it would have been better to wait for the natural collapse of the USSR, without provoking the imperial mindset of the Union's security structures — a course of action that ultimately backfired against the Armenians of Artsakh.

Conclusion
The article's key conclusion is that Operation "Ring," despite thorough preparation and coordination at the highest Union level, failed to achieve its goal of subjugating Artsakh to Azerbaijan, owing to the resilience of the people and their readiness for self-sacrifice — a factor underestimated by the Soviet leadership. At the same time, the author points to the political immaturity of the Armenian side itself as a contributing cause of the tragic events, emphasizing that the USSR's failure with regard to Artsakh became one of the symptoms of its loss of historical legitimacy and viability.